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As a rule, out-of-role behavior is thought to have greater
credibility than ln-roIe behavior in the sense that the former
IS more informative about real behefs than the latter Thus
even the simple-heart, seeking a reliable gmde to another's true
feehngs and being aware of the social obligations under which
this person labors, will discount behavior consistent with these
obhgations and pay special attention to behavior inconsistent
with the same
The theoretical explanation is straightforward (Heider,
1958, Jones & Davis, 1965, Kelley, 1967) In order to evaluate
the credibihty of an action the observer first must decide
whether the action is internally determined ("he said X because
he beheves X is true") or extemally determined ("he said X
IS true because his position obhges him to say X is true") When
both classes of determinants provide a reasonable explanation
for the action (in-role behavior) each is given less weight than
when only one offers a reasonable accountmg (out-of-role be-
havior) Thus, if the act is m hne with one's role obligations
then both extemal and intemal causation are plausible, if, how-
ever, the act IS out of line, only the latter is plausible It follows
then that out-of-role behavior is more credible than m-role
behavior because the former is more likely than the latter to
be attnbuted solely to intemal causes From a different theo-
retical stance Skinner and others make a similar distinction
between tacts or behavior under the control of discriminative
1 This research was supported by a grant from the National Institute of
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stimuh ( e g , statements which the person believes are accurate
descnptions of the world) and mands or behavior under the
control of reinforcing stimuli ( e g , statements which the person
believes will have profitable consequences)
The present study explores two aspects of the attribution
of credibihty The first has to do with the observer's prior belief
about the behavior Does out-of-role behavior seem more
credible than m-role behavior regardless of how much more
unthinkable or repugnant the former is than the latter-* The
second involves the generalization of credibility Does the
credibihty attnbuted to out-of-role behavior spread to other
acts which are role-neutral, being neither prescribed nor pro-
scribed by the role m question^*
Attribution phenomena are often descnbed in the language
of inferential statistics ( e g , Kelley, 1967, 1973) This inad-
vertently suggests scmpulous objectivity on the part of the
observer Few researchers, however, will take the suggestion
seriously because there are well known and fairly compelling
reasons for expecting observers with different behefs to draw
rather different conclusions from the identical behavior Re-
search on prestige suggestion (Asch, Block, & Hertzman, 1938,
Lewis, 1941) li perhaps the classical demonstration that the
credibility of an assertion depends not only on its ln-role/out-
of-role character but also on the observer's beliefs about the
person doing the asserting The cognitive consistency literature
leads one to expect similar kinds of effects For instance, Osgood
and Tannenbaum (1955) contend that if an observer has a
strong belief about how a certain actor should behave and this
behef is disconfirmed, say, by information that the actor has
engaged in out-of-role behavior, the observer will senously doubt
this information
Attnbution theorists with a Rayesian and/or information
processing bent probably would agree that pnor beliefs are
important For instance, they might conjecture that the amount
of information required to make a stable inference about another
depends on prior behefs (see Ajzen, 1971, Kelley, 1973, and
Trope, 1974) Thus their prediction could well be that if
the actor's behavior disconfirms a strongly held belief, the ob-
server will make only tentative inferences or entirely suspend
judgment until he obtains additional information, if, however.
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his prior belief about the actor was weak (or, of course, con-
gruent with the behavior), the observer will have no need for
nor will he seek much additional information In fact. Barefoot
and Straub (1971) and Girodo (1973) have tested some of
these speculations, but only in the context of self-attribution
The attnbution process is in part one of generahzation
whereby behaviors are perceived as similar because they often
share certain critical features, e g, they occur together in close
sequence, they mamfest the identical intention, they are emitted
by the same person, they are directed to the same person, etc
As a result the observer is able to transform complex and vanable
information about the contingencies of action into concise,
stable representations of the actor's personality Many would
assume such a process is functional and pervasive If so, the
tendency to generalize from one behavior to another may be
strong, perhaps automatic On the other hand, generalization
phenomena such as the "halo effect" diminish when the actions
being evaluated are clearly expressed and substantially different
( e g , see Rommetveit, 1960), and, of course, when comparmg
m-role or out-of-role acts with those which are role-neutral, there
IS another distinguishing feature—the former behaviors are
closely tied to the actor's role, the latter are not All m all then,
the spread of credibihty to role-neutral acts is an open issue
It IS simply unclear under what conditions observers who believe
a person has behaved frankly, mdependently, etc, m one domain
will attribute similar charactenstics to his behavior m another
domain
The present study contains two very similar expenments
They differ mainly in respect to the actors, the latter being
chosen so that what is m-role (or out-of-role) for one is out-
of-role (or m-role) for the other (see Jones, Davis, & Gergen,
1961) Prior to observing the actor individuals indicate their
belief that he is likely to hold particular attitudes They then
have an opportunity to hear the actor discuss issues which are
relevant to these attitudes Following this, individuals mdicate
the extent to which they (1) perceive the m-role or out-of-role
character of the behavior, (2) take the actor's pronouncements
as credible, as reflecting his own behefs, and (3) revise their
prior behefs about the actor in the hght of his actions
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EXPERIMENT I
Method
Subjects One hundred twenty male undergraduates at the Uni-
versity of Michigan were recruited for this expenment from a volunteer
subject pool and paid at the rate of $2 00 per hour The expenment
itself lasted about 45 mmutes
Procedure Subjects were told they were to be observers—a label
which we will use hereafter—m a study of social judgment They
leamed they would listen to an interview and then make certain judg-
ments about the person (actor) bemg interviewed The latter, with
an obviously Jewish name, was said to have recently graduated from
the School of Education at a nearby umversity where he was active
in the Hillel organization and in other Jewish student groups. He was
now applymg for a job at an excellent pnvate Jewish school The
job involved teaching current events and modem Jewish history The
tape the observers would hear was said to be part of a job interview
between our applicant and the headmaster of the school
After the actor and the interview setting were descnbed, observers
filled out a short questiomiaire On a seven-point scale they mdicated
their attitudes toward Israel (extremely pro-Israeli = 1, extremely
anti-Israeh = 7), the Common Market (extremely pro-Common Mar-
ket = 1, extremely anti-Common Market = 7), and strategic arms
limitation (extremely pro-arms limitation = 1, extremely anti-arms limi-
tation = 7 ) Fmally they were asked m the light of the mformation
received about the actor to estimate the likelihood that he is m fact
really pro-Israeli, pro-Common Market, and pro-arms hmitation Each
of the latter estimates were made on 20-pomt scales (e g, I am cer-
tam he IS really pro-Israeli = 1, I am certam he is really not pro-
Israeh = 20) »
Observers were then played one of two versions of the taped
mterview m which they heard the actor respond to questions about
his views on the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Common Market, and
strategic arms limitation In the tn-rcHe version observers heard the
actor consistently make strong positive statements about Israeh j[K)h-
cies, m the out-of-role version he consistently made strong negative
statements about these pobcies Identical evaluations of the Common
Market and arms limitation were made by the actor in both the m-role
and out-of-role conditions These consisted of moderately positive to
3 For purposes of analysis and presentation "not really pro-Israeh" is con-
sidered "anti" and the scale values were converted to probabihties, e g , 1 =
1 0, 2 = 95, e t c , for likelihood of the actor bemg really pro-Israeh, and 20 =
1 0 , 19 = 95, e t c , for the likelihood of the actor bemg really anti-Israeh
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highly positive statements * The issues were discussed dunng the
interview m the same order under both conditions the Common Mar-
ket, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and finally, strategic arms limitation
At the conclusion of the taped interview all observers responded
to a second questionnaire The statements made about the three
issues were rated separately ( e g , "I thmk the statements made by
Mr Cohen about the Common Market were ") on seven pomt
scales anchored by the followmg pairs of adjectives Loyal (l)-Dis-
loyal (7), Independent (l)-Conformmg (7), Sincere (l)-Insmcere
(7), and Frank (l)-Deceptive (7) The first two pairs assessed the
observer's perception of the m-role/out-of-role character of the three
sets of statements, the remainmg two pairs measured their perceived
credibility Observers always rated the Common Market statements
first, statements about the Arab-Israeh conflict second, and the arms
limitation statements third Observers then were asked to consider
the actor "as a person what he is hke in general" and to rate him
on the same set of traits The next part of the questioimaire was
essentially a repetition of the pre-interview hkehhood estimate, that
IS, observers estimated the hkehhood of the actor bemg pro-Israeh or
anti-Israeh, pro-Common Market or anti-Common Market, etc, in
the hght of what he said dunng the mterview
A final Item had observers rate the extent to which they would
have hked to have been given more information on what " Cohen
IS hke and how he felt about the mterview " before makmg their
judgment This was done on a seven-pomt scale (I would have hked
more information = 1, I would not have hked more information = 7)
Results
The data in this and the following experiment were treated
by means of analysis of variance Unless otherwise specified,
the observer's attitude toward Israel and the actor's statements
about Israel constitute main effects in the analyses
Observers were divided into three groups according to their
self-rated attitudes toward Israel Although there was an overall
bias in favor of Israel, observers whose ratings fell m the upper
quartile of the distnbution of ratmgs were considered pro-
Israeli, those m the lower quartile, anti-Israeli, and those in the
middle half of the distribution, neutral.'^
4 The m-role and out-of-role transcnpts are available upon request
5 On seven-pomt scale (l=:very pro-Israeh, 7 =: very anti-Israeh), the
pro-Israeli mean was 13, the neutral mean was 3 2 and the anti-Israeli mean
was 5 1
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Table 1 Extent to which m-role (pro-Israeli) and out-of-role (anti-
Israeli) behaviors were perceived as such Mean ratings of inde-





































There is good evidence that the ln-role/out-of-role distinction
was clear to subjects Anti-Israeli (out-of-role) statements were
considered to be more independent and disloyal than the pro-
Israeli (m-role) statements (see Table 1) The main effects
for statements m both instances are quite reliable (PF < 005)
The traits of independence and disloyalty also were gener-
alized to the actor "as a person," that is, he was considered a
relatively independent and disloyal person after acting out-of-
role and a relatively conforming and loyal person after acting
m-role (PF < 01) The observers' evaluations of statements
about the Common Market and arms limitation were unaffected
by the actor's comments on Israel
The credibility of ln-role and out-of-role acts may be in-
ferred from observers' judgments of their smcenty and frankness
The means for these ratings are given m Table 2 A significant
main effect was obtained for observers (PF < 05) indicating
that neutrals attnbuted only a moderate amount of smcenty
to the actor's comments about Israel, while both the pro-Israeli
and anti-Israeli observers attnbuted considerable smcenty to
them A borderline Observer X Statements interaction (Pt <
10) suggests that the actor seemed more sincere behavmg ln-
Table 2 Credibihty of m-role (pro-Israeh) and out-of-role (anti-
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role than out-of-role for pro-Israeli observers A similar pattern
appeared m ratings of frankness Observers tended to make
httle distinction between in-role and out-of-role statements,
those who were neutral judging both as moderately frank, while
those who were pro-Israeli or anti-Israeh attnbutmg greater
frankness to both sets of statements {PF < 05) When these
three ratings are combined into an overall index of credibility
(see Table 2) neutral observers assign less credibility to either
kind of act than pro-Israeli or anti-Israeli observers {PF < 01)
The ln-role actor "as a person" was seen as more frank than the
out-of-role actor by pro-Israeh observers (M = 2 0 vs 3 7, re-
spectively) while the reverse was the case for anti-Israeli ob-
servers (M = 40 vs 15, respectively) Neutrals made little
differentiation m general frankness as a function of the actor's
statements about Israel (M = 30 vs 2 5, respectively) The
Observer X Statement interaction was quite reliable {PF < 01)
A similar pattern, albeit nonsignificant, appeared for ratings of
general sincerity Again neither the observer's attitude toward
Israel nor the actor's statements in this regard had any noticeable
effects on evaluations of the latter's pronouncements about the
Common Market or arms limitation
Analyses were then performed on the observer's estimate
of the actor's true behefs Judgments made prior to hearing
the interview indicated that pro-Israeli observers overestimated
the likelihood of pro-Israeli attitudes (and underestimated the
likelihood of anti-Israeli attitudes) compared to neutral and
anti-Israeh observers (PF < 01) " In a separate analysis these
prior likelihood estimates were compared with those made after
heanng the interview (see Table 3) Following the interview
observers believed it increasingly likely that the actor's attitudes
corresponded to his statements about Israel {Pi- < 01) How-
ever, they revised their beliefs much more following out-of-role
6 Similar over- or underestimation are also obtamed in the second experi-
ment Their discovery suggested the possibility that the various effects of ob-
servers' attitudes on credibility and bebef revision might be mediated by such
'biases' in judgment To determme if this was the case analyses of covanance
were performed with the initial likelihood estimate as the covanate In no mstance
did the pattem of results (mam effects or interactions) differ substantially from
that based on the analyses of vanance presented m this and in our second experi-
ment Thus, it can be concluded that the effects attnbuted to observers' attitudes
were not mediated by differential tendencies to over- or underestimate the pnor
likelihood of pro- or anti-Israel attitudes m the actors
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Table 3 Estimated hkehhood that actor holds pro-Israeh or anti-
Israeh attitudes before and after observing his m-role (pro-Israeh)



























statements than following m-role statements ( PF < 001) and
this revision tends to be more extensive among pro-Israeli and
anti-Israeh observers than neutral observers {PF < 05) Small
but reliable revisions occurred on hkehhood estimates of atti-
tudes toward the Common Market and arms limitation ( PF <
01 and PF < 05, respectively) Revisions were always in the
direction of the statements about these issues but did not vary
with the in-role/out-of-role variables
Finally an analysis was made of how much the observer
desired further information about the situation and the actor
Those who were faced with out-of-role behavior indicated a
much stronger desire for additional information than those who
dealt with ln-role behavior (Pp< 01) A near significant in-
teraction (Pf < 10) suggests that pro-Israeli observers were




Subjects As m the first experiment all 120 male undergraduates
were recruited from a volunteer pool and paid $2 00 per hour
Procedure The procedure and matenals were identical to that
of the first expenment m every respect except that the actor was pre-
sented to observers as an Arab who was bom and raised m the Near-
East and sent to the U S for his umversity training He recently
graduated from the School of Education at a nearby university where
he was active m the Arab Student Association as well as m other
Arab groups Before retummg to the Near-East he wanted to get
some teachmg expenence and to that end had applied for a job at
an excellent pnvate school estabhshed by the embassies of several
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Table 4 Extent to which m-role (anti-Israeh) and out-of-role (pro-
Israeh) behaviors were perceived as such Mean ratmgs of inde-





































Arab countnes to serve their nationals stationed in the U S The
job involved teachmg current events and modem Arab history The
tape observers were to hear was said to be part of a job interview
between the apphcant and the headmaster of the school
The same tapes were used as previously, m this expenment, how-
ever, the one containing pro-Israeh statements is the out-of-role
tape and the one containmg anti-Israeli statements, the in-role tape
Results
Observers were divided into pro-Israeh, neutral, and anti-
Israeli groups according to cntena previously discussed Again
a bias m favor of Israel was evident, similar m degree to that
found in our earlier sample In-role behavior (anti-Israeli state-
ments), was generally considered more loyal and conforming
{PF < 01) than out-of-role behavior (pro-Israeh statements),
as IS shown in Table 4 Similar results were obtained in ratings
of the actor "as a person "
The Common Market and arms limitation statements were
also rated for loyalty and conformity None of the effects ap-
proached an acceptable level of significance
Neutral observers perceived out-of-role behavior as more
sincere and frank than ln-role behavior while pro-Israeli as well
as anti-Israeli observers perceived the former as less sincere
and frank than the latter (see Table 5) The interaction effect
on both ratings is reliable (PF < 05) In this case, then, neutral
observers judge out-of-role behavior as more credible than ln-
role behavior while pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli observers do just
the reverse A somewhat similar pattem appears m ratings of
the actor "as a person " In evaluating how sincere a person he
IS, pro-Israeh and anti-Israeli observers attributed greater sin-
centy to the actor under ln-role conditions (M = 1 7 and 2 6,
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Table 5 Credibility of in-role (anti-Israeh) and out-of-role (pro-



































respectively) than under out-of-role conditions (M = 5 2 and
5 0, respectively) Neutral observers made little differentiation
between the sincerity of the ln-role (M = 3 1) and that of the
out-of-role (M = 2 8) actor "as a person" Furthermore, in
judging general frankness, both pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli ob-
servers considered an in-role actor to be more frank "as a person"
(M = 2 8 and 2 3, respectively) than an out-of-role actor (M =
4 9 and 4 7, respectively) while neutral observers judged the
reverse to be true, an m-role actor being seen as less frank a
person than an out-of-role actor (M = 3 3 and 2 6 respectively)
These effects involving ratings of the actor "as a person" were
significant at the 05 level or better Analyses of the ratings of
the smcenty and frankness of the actors' statements regarding
the Common Market and arms limitation demonstrate no reliable
mam effects or interactions as a function of our independent
vanables.
Analyses were then performed on the observer's estimate of
the actor's true behefs pnor to hearing the interview Com-
pared to anti-Israeli and neutral observers, pro-Israeli observers
underestimated {PF < 05) the hkehhood of pro-Israeli attitudes
(or overestimated the likelihood of anti-Israeli attitudes) In
a separate analysis these prior likelihood estimates were com-
pared with those made following the interview presentation
The companson reveals a highly significant overall revision
{PF < 001) The two interaction effects indicated by the pat-
tem of results m Table 6 were also reliable by traditional stan-
dards, or nearly so That is to say, observers revised their beliefs
more after out-of-role than after m-role behavior {PF < 01)
and this effect was particularly strong among neutral observers
{PF< 10)
Finally, out-of-role behavior led observers to want further
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Table 6 Estimated likelihood that actor holds anti-Israeh or pro-
Israeh attitudes before and after observing his ln-role (anti-Israeh)
































information to a greater extent than m-role behavior {PF < 05)
Moreover, under out-of-role conditions, both pro-Israeli and
anti-Israeli observers expressed a stronger desire than neutral
observers {PF < 05)
DISCUSSION
Out-of-role political statements not only were recogmzed as
disloyal and nonconforming activities but they also drastically
affected the observer's behef about an actor's true attitude
Revisions in the estimated likelihood of a Jew being anti-Israeli
and an Arab being pro-Israeli were substantial following out-
of-role pronouncements Moreover, the magmtude of revision
vaned with the observer's OWTI attitude Unfortunately the latter
effect differed markedly across experiments In the first experi-
ment both pro-Israeh and anti-Israeli observers revised their
beliefs about a Jew who made anti-Israeh comments more than
neutral observers, m the second experiment neutral observers
revised their beliefs about an Arab who made pro-Israeh com-
ments more than pro-Israeli and anti-Israeli observers More-
over, this pattem of differences in the magnitude of revision
corresponds exactly to the pattem of differences in credibility
attnbuted to out-of-role behavior Both pro-Israeli and anti-
Israeli observers judge anti-Israeh statements by a Jew to be
more frank and sincere than do neutral observers, while the
latter judge the pro-Israeh statements by an Arab to be more
frank and sincere than do pro-Israeh and anti-Israeli observers
Thus there is evidence that the impact of out-of-role behavior is
mediated by its perceived credibility But nothing in the present
study permits us to say why credibility varies m this fashion
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With observers' attitudes Thus no really straightforward inter-
pretation can be made regarding the relationship between prior
belief and the attribution process We do offer, however, the
following conjecture since our observers are heavily pro-
Israeh, anti-Israeh statements are likely to be seen as socially
undesirable acts Such behaviors are generally assumed to be
more credible than those which are socially desirable (see Jones
& Davis, 1965) Suppose in our study that (1) judgments of
credibihty were based not only on whether the behavior was
in- or out-of-role, but also whether it was socially desirable or
undesirable, and (2) biased observers compared to neutral
observers gave much greater weight to social desirabihty If
this were the case, then the findings on credibihty and revision
of opimon display a consistent pattem biased observers com-
pared to neutral observers tend to see the socially undesirable
anti-Israeli statements as much more credible, and thus are more
likely to revise behefs in the hght of such behavior, regardless
of whether the latter are m-role or out-of-role
A second rather strong effect of prior beliefs is readily ex-
phcable, being perfectly consistent with findings from other
likelihood estimation studies In both expjeriments pro-Israeli
observers underestimated the likelihood of out-of-role beliefs m
the actor—of a Jew being anti-Israeli and an Arab being pro-
Israeli—compared to neutral and anti-Israeli observers The
vanous theories of cogmtive consistency, especially as they bear
on person perception, imply that something like overestimation
should occur, to wit in the absence of other information an
observer will expect a person possesses consistent attnbutes to
the extent that the observer believes these attributes are im-
portant and closely related Studies in which individuals esti-
mate the likelihood of an individual having a specific char-
acteristic given that he has one or more related characteristics
provide good support for this assertion (Bumstem, 1967, DeSoto
& Kuethe, 1959, McNeel & Messick, 1970). Recall that our pro-
Israeh observers were in both experiments much more extreme
than either neutral or anti-Israeh observers Hence it is fairly
reasonable to assume that a person's attitude toward Israel is
a more unportant issue, and perhaps more closely related to
ethmcity for him, than for these other observers If either sup-
position IS correct then it follows that pro-Israeh observers are
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more likely than others to believe that a Jew is pro-Israeh, not
anti-Israeh, and an Arab is anti-Israeli, not pro-Israeh
The methodological importance of such biases m estimation
of beliefs is perhaps self-evident, that is, the differential impact
of m-role and out-of-role behavior cannot be assessed adequately
unless prior beliefs are taken into consideration In our first
experiment, for example, merely assessing post-behavior esti-
mates of the actor's tme attitude would suggest that out-of-role
behavior has less impact as observers become increasingly pro-
Israeh (see Table 3, column labelled "After"), when, in fact, the
relationship is curvihnear—both pro-Israeh and anti-Israeh ob-
server revise prior beliefs more than neutrals Perhaps earlier
studies of ln-role/out-of-role variables gave relatively weak
results because the behef-revision aspect of attribution processes
was not stressed and thus not deemed necessary to assess pnor
beliefs (e g., Jones & Hams, 1967)
When asked to make comparable judgments about the actor
"as a person" observers generalized from their evaluations of his
statements about the Arab-Israeh confhct The effect was per-
vasive and strong After noting he had behaved, say, in an
independent fashion when responding to the mterviewer's
questions about Israeh pohcies, observers judged the actor to be
in general a quite independent person Nevertheless, this did
not influence their judgments of his comments on the Common
Market and arms limitation
On the face of it the generahzation effects are a puzzle In-
role behavior was perceived as markedly different from out-of-
role behavior, and the characteristics attnbuted to these dis-
tinctive acts were generalized to the actor as personal traits,
yet there was no tendency to generalize further to role-neutral
behavior. It is as if observers were willing to make inferences
about a relatively important matter (the actor's personality), but
were loathe to make comparable inferences about relatively
unimportant matters (his statements regarding the Common
Market and arms hmitation) Our speculation is that these
effects resulted from differences in the amoimt of information
contained m the entities to be judged. Observers were told
virtually nothing about the actor "as a person." The statements
he made about Israel, however, had a good deal of substance
in addition to saying something about demeanor under social
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pressure It is not surpnsmg, therefore, that these detailed
assertions were useful in forming an opinion about his per-
sonahty Indeed, observers were probably obliged to generalize
from the former when pressed for an opimon regarding the
latter This was not the case for role-neutral opinions They,
hke their role-relevant counterpart, were packed with much
information, and thus observers had a good basis for evaluating
them m respect to their loyalty, frankness, etc, independent of
what had been said about Israel In other words, because the
role-neutral statements were relatively distinct and well elab-
orated, they could be (and apparently were) judged m their
own nght It is worth noting that under such conditions Rom-
metveit (1960) also observed "halo effects" to be inhibited
That attributions made following out-of-role behavior are
tentative is strongly suggested by the fmdmg that following
such behavior observers have a marked preference for additional
information about the actor and the situation Furthermore,
recall that pro-Israeli and anti-Israeh observers in the second
expenment were sure, compared to a neutral observer, that the
actor they were about to hear would be anti-Israeli Under out-
of-role conditions, after listemng to the interview they came
to the conclusions that the actor was probably pro-Israeli but
with much less certainty than a neutral observer It tumed out
that, followmg the out-of-role performance, pro-Israeh and anti-
Israeli observers also indicated a stronger desire for additional
information than neutral observers In the first expenment pro-
Israeli observers were least certain of the actor's real behefs
following out-of-role behavior and they were the ones who also
tended to express the strongest need for more information It
would seem then that the observer's desire for additional infor-
mation depends directly on the extent to which his observations
lead him to abandon a relatively certain opinion of the actor
for a relatively uncertain and contrary one
SuMMABY
Out-of-role behavior markedly changed the observer's behef
about the actor's tme attitude Revisions m the estimated like-
lihood of a Jew bemg anti-Israeli and an Arab bemg pro-Israeli
were substantial followmg out-of-role statements. Moreover,
the observer's own attitude affected the extent to which he felt
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the actor's behavior was credible and the extent to which he
revised his behef about the actor m the hght of his behavior
These effects differed in our two experiments, however, and no
good explanation could be offered for the difference
One consistent and strong result mvolving pnor beliefs was
obtamed extremely pro-Israeli observers overestimated the like-
lihood of m-role attitudes (a Jew being pro-Israeli or an Arab
being anti-Israeh) and underestimated the likelihood of out-of-
role attitudes (a Jew bemg anti-Israeh or an Arab bemg pro-
Israeh)
Observers consistently generahzed from their evaluations of
the actor's role-relevant behavior to evaluations of the actor "as
a person " However, there was no tendency to generalize from
role-relevant to role-neutral acts Finally, observers under out-
of-role conditions expressed a greater desire for additional infor-
mation about the actor than those under m-role conditions This
desire seemed particularly marked if, after noting what the actor
said, the observer was relatively uncertain about what attitude
to attnbute to him
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